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UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
IN MINNESOTA
By DONALD E. BRIDGMAN*
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE ACTT HE Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was passed in Min-
nesota in 1921, Laws of 1921, Chapter 415, to take effect
January 1st, 1922. It was drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and approved and
recommended by it for passage in all the states at its annual con-
ference in 1918. This is the same conference which prepared the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, and other Uniform Acts.1
The Fraudulent Conveyance Act has already been enacted in
eleven states2 which, with the year of enactment, are as follows:
Arizona, 1919, Delaware, 1919, Maryland, 1920, Michigan, 1919,
Minnesota, 1921, New Hampshire, 1919, New Jersey, 1919, Penn-
sylvania, 1921, South Dakota, 1919, Tennessee, 1919, Wisconsin,
1919. Considering the short time the 6.ct has been out of the
conference, this is a very good showing.
The purpose of the act is to give greater certainty and also
uniformity to the law of fraudulent conveyances, rather than to
change the law; and in general the existing common law is fol-
lowed. The explanatory note prefixed to the official edition of
the act' gives the reason for drafting the act, as follows:
"Existing confusions in the law relating to conveyances in
fraud of creditors make the adoption by the several states of an
act which shall put an end to the confusions by concise and clear
statements of legal principles pertaining to the subject a matter
of practical importance.
"The confusions and uncertainties of the existing law are
due primarily to three things:
*Member of the Bar of the City of Minneapolis.
'The Uniform Commercial Acts in force in Minnesota are as
follows--
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, G.S. 1913, Secs. 5813-6009;
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, G.S. 1913, Secs. 4514-4575; Uniform
Sales Act, Laws 1917, Ch. 465; Uniform Bills of Lading Act, Laws
1917, Ch. 399; Uniform Partnership Act, Laws 1921, Ch. 487; Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, Laws 1919, Ch. 498; Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, Laws 1921, Ch. 415.2This does not include whatever states may pass the act at the
1923 session.
3A reprint of the official text of the act with notes is to be found
in 44 Am. Bar Ass'n Rep. 341 and in 5 Am. Bar Ass'n Journal 491.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"First, the absence of any well recognized, definite conception
of insolvency. 4
"Second, failure to make clear the persons legally injured by
a given fraudulent conveyance.
"Third, the attempt to make the Statute of Elizabeth cover
all conveyances which wrong creditors, even though the actual
intent to defraud does not exist.
"The Statute of Elizabeth condemns conveyances as fraudu-
lent only when made with the 'intent' to 'hinder, delay or de-
fraud.' There are many conveyances which wrong creditors
where an intent to defraud on the part of the debtor does not in
fact exist. In order to avoid these conveyances, the courts have
called to their assistance presumptions of law as to intent, and in
equity have pushed presumption of fraud as a fact to an un-
warranted xtent; with the result that, while in the main the de-
cisions under the facts do justice, the reasoning supporting them
leaves much to be desired.
"In the act as drafted all possibility of a presumption of law
as to intent is avoided. Certain conveyances which the courts
have in practide condemned, such as a gift by an insolvent, are
declared fraudulent irrespective of intent.5 On the other hand,
while all conveyances with intent to defraud creditors6 are de-
clared fraudulent, it is expressly stated that the intent must be
'actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed as a matter
of law.'
"The act as drafted makes few changes in the law of any
state. In thii subject, as in many others in our law, need for
definite 'statutory statement does n6 arise so much from actual
conflict between the law of different jurisdictions arising out of
clear cut differences in judicial opinion, as from the -confusion
of thought manifested in- judicial opinion, which renders the
law in a great degree uncertain in all jurisdictions.
"'The chief benefit to be derived from the adoption of a
unifo.rm act on conveyances in fraud of creditors is that, if
properly enforced, it will give i known certainty to the law which
it does not now posses."
.The advantages of this act are also found in the fact that
the law is brought into uniformity with other states. Business
is conducted to a large extent between different states; and in
granting and obtaining credit the law governing fraudulent con-
veyances is an important feature. A certain and uniform law
aids in extending credit. Further, the law of fraudulent convey-
ances is closely related to bankruptcy; and with a federal Bank-
ruptcy Act the same in all states, it is desirable to have fraudulent
conveyances also governed by a uniform law.
4 Covered by sections 1 and 2 of UniformAct.5Sec. 4, also sec. 5, 6 and 8.6See sec. 7.
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The Fraudulent Conveyance Act was prepared by the Com-
mittee on Commercial Law of the National Conference of which
Sampson R. Child of Minneapolis was a member, also Prof.
Samuel Williston of Harvard Law School. Prof. William Draper
Lewis, of University of Pennsylvania Law School, was drafts-
man of the act. Tentative drafts of the act were before the
National Conference for three years for consideration, before
final adoption in 1918.
SCOPE OF THE ACT
The scope of the act is to put into statutory form the Statute
of Elizabeth 7 relating to conveyances fraudulent as to creditors
and the rules of construction which have developed around it.
This statute, in one form or another, is the law in every state;
and is found in Minnesota in section 7013,8 General Statutes 1913,
and also in sections 7014, 7015, 7016 and 70199 in so far as the
last four sections apply to section 7013. Section 7013 is therefore
expressly repealed in section 14 "of the Uniform Act, because
superseded; but the other four sections are not expressly repealed,
since by their terms they are general in nature and apply to the
entire subdivision or chapter, and therefore remain to govern the
interpretation of sections 7011, 7018, etc. The topics covered by
these four sections, in so far as they applied to section 7013,
are largely provided for expressly in the Uniform Act, but in
a somewhat different way."0
713 Eliz. C. 5, (1570).
8This section is as follows:-
"Every conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any
estate or interest in lands, or of any rents or profits issuing therefrom,
and every charge upon lands, or upon the rents or profits thereof, made
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons of
their lawful actions, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, and every
bond -or other evidence of debt given, action commenced, and order or
judgment suffered, with like intent, as against the persons so hindered,
delayed or defrauded, shall be void."
OThese sections provide that the conveyances fraudulent against
creditors are fraudulent against their successors and assigns, etc., that
fraudulent intent is a question of fact, that the title of a bona fide
purchaser shall not be impaired, and that "conveyance" covers every
creation, assignment, etc., of any estate or interest in lands.
'
0 The source of section 7013, and of the four subseouent sections
relating to it, is as follows: statute 13 Eliz., chap. 5, (1570) provided
that all conveyances, etc., of lands, and goods, and all bonds or judg-
ments, etc., made with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and
others of their debts, etc., shall as against such persons, their repre-
sentatives and assigns be void, but this was not to extend to convey-
ances, etc., on good consideration, bona fide to a person without notice
of the fraud.
The courts gradually built around this statute rules that certain
facts constituted constructive fraudulent intent, regardless of the actual
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Many states do not have a statute corresponding to section
7010 relating to transfers of goods and things in action in trust
for the grantor; and since the law under this section is usually
regarded as practically in the same field with the Uniform Act,
the repeal of section 7010 by section 14 of the Uniform Act is
in aid of statutory uniformity.1 It is to be noted that section
intent, until in 1818, in Reade v. Livingston, (1818) 3 John. Ch, 481,
Chancellor Kent in New York held that a voluntary conveyance was
constructively fraudulent as to creditors, if the grantor had any debts,
although sufficient assets remained to care for the debts. There was a
legislative reaction against this rule; and in 1829 an act was passed in
New York, following the provisions of the Statute of Elizabeth, but
adding a section to the effect that fraudulent intent was a question of
fact, and that no conveyance should be adjudged fraudulent solely be-
cause it was without consideration. New York, Revised Statutes 1829,
part ii, Ch. vii, title iii, vol. ii, p. 137. This New York statute was
copied directly or indirectly in a number of states; and the Minnesota
statute, sections 7013 to 7016, and 7019, G.S. 1913, was originally taken
from it in 1851 (Ch. 64 R.S. 1851) almost verbatim. For some reason,
in the 1866 revision, "goods or things in action" were omitted, leaving
the statute applying in terms only to land; but the Minnesota court
has held that the Statute of Elizabeth is merely declaratory of the
common law, and that by common law transfers of chattels and things
in action with intent to defraud creditors are void as to creditors, al-
though not expressly mentioned in the statute. Byrnes v. Volz, (1893)
53 Minn. 110, 54 N.W. 942. Thus the Minnesbta Statute of 1913 was
derived from the Statute of Elizabeth with some slight modifications,
and a revised terminology; and as construed by our courts it repre-
sented in a general way the law, statutory or common, in most of the
states. This is the situation the Uniform Act was drafted to meet. It,
also, is based on the Statute of Elizabeth, as construed by the courts;
and there should not be great difficulty in using the Uniform Act in
Minnesota. Many of the decisions of the court under the former
statute should still be effective under the new act.
It may be of.interest to note that chapters 62, 63, and 64, R.S. 1851,
relating to Fraudulent Conveyances and Statute of Frauds, are almost
verbatim the same as chapter vii, part ii, R.S. 1829, of New York,
omitting some sections on retention of possession by a vendor of
goods. The New York chapter had three titles. The division was (1)
Fraudulent Conveyances and Contracts Relative to Lands, (2) Relative
to Chattels and Things in Action, and (3) General Provisions. The
last included the Statute of Elizabeth. In General Statutes, Minnesota,
1866, the arrangement was changed to the present one; and chapter
41 of Minn., G.S. 1866 has the three titles: Conveyances Fraudulent
as to Purchasers, Statute of Frauds, and Conveyances Fraudulent as
to Creditors. This was a return to the original English statutory ar-
rangement; and is the same as chapter 68, Minn., G.S. 1913, except
that the Statute of Frauds now comes first, Section 7010 dated from
1851, being originally in the chapter relating to chattels. Sections
7011 and 7012 on retention of possession appear in 1866. Section 7018,
Bulk Sales law, was passed in 1899. Section 6707, regarding a result-
ing trust for creditors, dates from 1851, as does section 6719. The re-
quirement for filing a chattel mortgage appears in 1866.
"'The comment of Prof. Williston on the effect of the Uniform
Act on section 7010 is:
"I should suppose that section 7010 would also be superseded,
leading to the consequence which would, I suppose, have represented
the common law in many states, that a conveyance by a solvent grantor
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7010 relates only to personal property, and that the Minnesota
supreme court has held that at least in some of its aspects it merely
states the common law which applies also to reality. 2 Now section
11 of the Uniform Act provides that in any case not provided for
in the act, the rules of law and equity shall govern, which means
that in such case the common law is in force. The common law
rule, therefore, which corresponds to section 7010, but which
governs land as well as chattels and choses in action, would appear
to remain in force under the Uniform Act.
It would seem that the provisions of the Uniform Act might
also apply, as well as section 6707, General Statutes 1913, to the
rights of creditors where the debtor furnishes the consideration
for a conveyance to another party. If an insolvent debtor instead
of making a direct gift of his property to C, uses it as considera-
tion to B for B conveying to C, should not this be regarded as a
conveyance void as to creditors under section 4 of the Uniform
Act, and not merely presumptively fraudulent under section 6707?
The Uniform Act in its protection of subsequent creditors and in
other particulars is broader than section 6707. There is division
of opinion among the states as to whether or not such a pur-
chase of property in the name of a third person by the debt6r,
comes within the Statute of Elizabeth;18 but there is an indica-
tion in several Minnesota cases1O 4 that the statute on resulting
trusts for creditors15 and on fraudulent conveyances"0 are.closely
related, and that the securing of a conveyance to another when
the debtor furnishes the consideration, may be treated as a
zonveyance fraudulent as to creditors. The word "conveyance!'
in section 1 of the Uniform Act, which is defined as including
certain transfers, etc., but not to the exculsion of others, is easily
open to the interpretation that it includes a conveyance by an
outside person, where the debtor pays for it, in view of the fact
to another person in trust for the grantor is not fraudulent in the
absence of fraudulent intent, and the creditors of the grantor could not
treat the conveyance as void, but would be obliged to proceed in an
appropriate manner to secure the benefit of the grantor's equitable in-
terest in the same way as if the trust had been created by a third
person."
12Wetherill v. Canney, (1895) 62 Minn. 341, 64 N.W. 818; Ander-
son v. Lindberg, (1896) 64 Minn. 476, 67 N.W. 538; Stephon v. Topic,(1920) 147 Minn. 263, 266, 180 N.W. 221.
1327 CJ. 452, 453; Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances, 127-132.
'
4BIake v. Boisjoli, (1892). 51 Minn. 296, 53 N.W. 637; Leonard v.
Green, (1885) 34 Minn. 137, 24 N.W. 91'5; Stone v. Myers, (1864) 9
Minn. 303.1sSec. 6707.16Sec. 7013.
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that the Statute of Elizabeth has been held to apply to such
conveyances.
It would seem that payment of premiums on life insurance
policies would come within the terms of the Uniform Act, as
well as being governed by section 3465, General Statutes 1913,
which provides that:
"All premiums paid for insurance in fraud of creditors, with
interest thereon, shall inure to their benefit from the proceeds of
the policy, if the company be specifically notified thereof in
writing."
The section quoted does not attempt to define when the pay-
ments are in fraud of creditors. This is for the Uniform Act to
do. Although there is difference among the states17 it appears
that in Minnesota, in view of the above statute, payments of life
insurance premiums in connection with the payment of the policy
are regarded as a "conveyance" to the beneficiary and fall within
the terms of the Uniform Act. A discussion of payment of
life insurance premiums, showing themi to be in substance pay-
ments to the beneficiary, is found in Merchants' and Miners'
Transportation Co. v. Borland.18
There is also the question whether the Uniform Act does not
also apply to clhattel mortgages as well as the chattel mortgage
act, section 6966. For instance, if a chattel mortgage is given
for a disproportionately small sum by an insolvent debtor, is it
not absolutely fraudulent as to creditors under sections 3 and 4
of the Uniform Act, although duly filed and given in good faith?
A chattel mortgage falls clearly within the meaning of the word
"conveyance" in section 1 of the act. Are the words "purpose
of, hindering, delaying or defrauding any creditor" in section
6966 to be construed as referring to what the provisions in the
Uniform Act say is fraudulent 'as to creditors? Or are they to
retain the meaning which they have been given heretofore in the
decided cases, 9 and is a chattel mortgage also frauduIent if it is
given in a manner described as fraudulent in the Uniform Act?
A chattel mortgage seems to be regarded as falling within the
Statute of Elizabeth, and therefore the Uniform Act, in matters
not provided for in the chattel mortgage statute.2"
1727 C.J., 427, et seq.
18(1895) 53 N.J. Eq. 282, 31 Atl. 272.
'
9Dunnell's Digest, sec. 3884, et seq.20Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 400; 27 C.J. 451.
Prior to the passage of the chattel mortgage statute, the court held
such mortgages were governed by the chapter on fraudulent -convey-
ances, Chophard v. Bayard, (1860) 4 Minn. 533 (418); and after the
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The Uniform Act contains provisions relating to the remedies
of creditors,", not found in our statutes, outside of the attach-
ment statute.
There are matters which the act does not cover, that should
be referred to in discussing its scope. Sections 7011, and 7012,
relating to retention of possession by a seller of goods as pre-
sumptively fraudulent, and section 7018, Gefteral Statutes 1913,
the Bulk Sales law, though included in the same subdivision with
section 7013, yet are supplemental provisions relating to addi-
tional matters in fraud of creditors. Section 7017, requiring an
assignment of debt to be filed, is in the same category. These
sections are not superseded by the Uniform Act, and it is expressly
provided in Section 14 of the act that they are not repealed. Nor
does the Uniform Act cover the effect of omitting a trust in a
conveyance, section 6719. The rights of personal representatives
and assignees for creditors, under sections 7313, 7314 and 8332,
to recover back property fraudulently conveyed, remain unaf-
fected.
OUTLINE OF ACT
What is the effect of the Uniform Act within the field which
it covers? After a brief resum6 of its provisions, we will take
up the separate sections.
The first three sections constitute a definition of important
terms. "Conveyance" is made broad in section 1 to cover any
form of transfer of property; also "creditor" is broadly defined,
so the one 'word can cover persons having the various kinds of
claims. The definition of "insolvent" in section 2, uses the words
"assets" and "debts" defined in section 1, and is important in
relation to section 4. which declares certain conveyances by an
insolvent, fraudulent. "Fair consideration" defined in section 3
to exclude inadequate consideration, is used in sections 4, 5, 6
and 8, where certain conveyances, if made without fair considera-
tion, are declared fraudulent.
Sections 4 to 8 state what conveyances are fraudulent as to
creditors, and whether fraudulent as to present or both present
and future creditors. Sections 4, 5 and 6 declare that certain
conveyances without fair consideration are fraudulent as to credi-
tors without actual intent to defraud; that is. they are con-
passage of that statute, the court indicated that the law in that respect
had not been changed. Horton v. Williams, (1875) 21 Minn. 187. 189,
191. 2
'Secs. 9 and 10.
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structively fraudulent because of the circumstances under which
made,-thus conveyances by an insolvent,22 conveyances by per-
,sons in business leaving them with unreasonably small capital,2"
and conveyances by a person about to incur debts.2' Section 7
deals with conveyances where there is actual intent to defraud.
Section 8 states when conveyances by a partnership are fraudulent.
Sections 9 and 10 provide for the rights of creditors,--against
whom and how they can proceed to reach the property fraudu-
lently conveyed. One section treats of creditors whose claims
have matured, the other of creditors whose claims have not
matured.
"Sections 11 to 15 are provisions common to all uniform acts.
Section 11 provides expressly for the existing law to govern in
cases not provided f6r in the act, while section 12 provides .that
the act shall be construed to promote uniformity, that is, the
decisions of other states under the act shall have special weight.
A short name, "Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act," 2 a repeal-
ing clause,2 6 and a provision that the act shall take effect Jan.
1, 1922,27 complete the act.
SEPARATE SEcTIoNs OF THaE AcT
"Section 1. [Definition of Terms.] In this act 'assets' of
a debtor means property not exempt from liability for his debts.
To the extent that any property is liable for any debts of the
debtor, such property shall be included in his assets.
"'Conveyance' includes every payment of money, assignment,
release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or in-
tangible property, and also the creation of any lien or incumbrance.
"'Creditor' is a person having any claim, whether matured
or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or con-
tingent.
"'Debt' includes any legal libility, whether matured or un-
matured, liquidated or uniiquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent."
The term "assets," defined in this section, is used only in
section 2 in defining insolvency. It is apparent that "assets"
should not include exempt property which cannot be reached by
creditors, when being compared with "debts" to ascertain whether
there is a condition of insolvency such as produces a fraud on
creditors. In Minnesota with its liberal exemption laws, fixing
no value limit on the homestead exemption, this definition is of
special importance. A'gift of his property by a person leaving
him without unexempt assets to cover his debts, should be fraudu-
22Sec. 4. S4Sec. 6. 26Sec. 14.2sSec. 5. 25Sec. 13. 27Sec. 15.
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lent under section 4, regardless of how great the value of his
exempt property may be.
This definition probably states the former law as to fraudu-
lent conveyances, since it delays and defrauds creditors if the
debtor gives away his property leaving only exempt property, that
cannot be reached, as well as if he leaves himself with no prop-
erty.2s The rule under the Bankruptcy Act, sec. la(15), that ex-
empt property of the debtor shall be counted in ascertaining in-
solvency, is adopted because the statute clearly requires it.29
"Conveyance" is given a very broad meaning to cover any
possible form of transfer of property of any kind, or giving it as
security. It would cover the release of a debt. While this is a
larger meaning than the word usually has, yet when conveyances
fraudulent as to creditors are spoken of, the broadest use of the
word is understood. Certainly it is a convenience in the other
sections of the act to be able to use one word and avoid the repe-
tition of a long clause.
This full definition doubtless states the former law existing
prior to the passage of the Uniform Act. It covers all that section
7013 was intended to cover; and one word is used instead of
thirty-five words. It is true that the former statute, section 7013,
only referred in terms to land; but the court has held that trans-
fers of goods and choses in action in fraud of creditors are void
as to creditors at common law."
Reference has already been made to the fact that "convey-
ance" may well be construed to include conveyances to a third
person where the debtor furnishes the consideration, and pay-
ment of life insurance premiums in connection with payment of
the policies."-
The definition does not expressly exclude conveyance of
exempt property; but since fraudulent conveyance statutes have
all been construed not to apply to conveyances of exempt prop-
erty, to which the creditor has no right, 2 this act will without
doubt be construed the same way. Section 11 expressly provides
28Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 225; Underleak v. Scott, (1912)
117 Minn. 136, 142, 134 N.W. 731.2 9In re Baumann, (1899) 96 Fed. 946; In re Crenshaw (1907) 156
Fed. 638.
SODunnell's Digest, sec. 3853.
s
1See secs. 6707 and 3465, Minn., G.S. 1913.
32BIake v. Boisjoli, (1892) 51 Minn. 296, 53 N.W. 637; Dunnell's
Digest, sec. 3850; Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 52 et seq.; Glenn,
Creditor's Rights and Remedies, sec. 97.
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for existing rules of law to govern in cases not provided for in
the act.
The definition of "conveyance" does not exclude property
supposedly mortgaged to its full value. It has been held in Minne-
sota33 that the conveyance of such an equity is not fraudulent
because of no value. There is much to be said for the dissenting
opinion in the case, that it is for the creditor, not the jury, to
determine whether there is a value in the equity, and that the
creditor should have the equity if he wishes it. The dissent
appears to represent the better rule, as well as the weight of
authority,3 4 and since section 12 calls for uniform construction
of the act, the act may well change the law of Minnesota on this
point. Of course, the rule of Arets v. Kloos,35 is not affected, that
conveyance of property mortgaged to its full value, in satisfac-
tion of the mortgage debt, is not fraudulent, since the release
of the debt is consideration.
In the definition of "creditor," also, the -word is given the
broadest meaning, to include a person having any kind of a legal
claim. The word "creditor" thus includes all that was signified
by "creditors or other persons" in the former statute. There
would be included under the term "unmatured," any claim on a
debt not yet due, under the term "unliquidated," a claim for dam-
ages in tort though no sit had been brought,"6 .and under the
term "contingent," the right against a guarantor, or indorser of a
note. although the principal has given no indication of defaulting.
All of these are protected as claims of a "creditor" against fraudu-
lent conveyances.
This broad definition apparently represents the weight of
authority,37 although there is some conflict on several points.
Although a person having an unliquidated or contingent claim,
cannot have it satisfied out of the property fraudulently conveyed,
until it is liquidated, or the contingency has happened, yet the
definition is of significance in relation to section 4, since such
person is protected as a creditor against conveyances by an in-
solvent without fair consideration. and is regarded as a present
33Aultman v. Pikop, (1894) 56 Minn. 531, 58 N.W. 551.34Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances, 38. Glenn, Creditors' Rights
and Remedies, sec. 27.
35(1903) 89 Minn. 432, 95 N.W. 216. 769.
36An example of protection of one having a tort claim for damages
as existing creditor from the time the cause of action arose in Eschmann
v. Lords, (1920). 92 N.J. Eq. 382, 112 At]. 488.37Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 163, et seq.; 27 C. J. 472, 473,
476. 477.
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existing creditor, and not a future or subsequent creditor. The
definition apparently makes no change in the law of Minnesota,
except to make a clear and definite rule and remove any doubt.
Existing cases attach a broad significance to the words "creditors
or other persons" of the former statute."'
The term "debt" is defined to include any legal liability,
corresponding to the definition of "creditor" to include a person
having any legal claim. It includes in one word all that section
7013 meant by "lawful actions, damages, forfeitures, debts or
demands ;" and is a more modern and simpler mode of expression.
The significance of the words "unmatured," "unliquidated" and
"contingent" has been referred to under the definition of "credi-
tor." The same remarks, that this is a clarification of the law,
rather than a change, also apply to this definition.
"Section 2. [Insolvency.] (1) A person is insolvent when
the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount
that will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing
debts as they become absolute and matured.
"(2) In determining whether a partnership is insolvent there
shall be added to the partnership property the present fair salable
value of the separate assets of each general partner in excess of
the amount probably sufficient to meet the claims of his separate
creditors, and also the amount of any unpaid subscription to the
partnership of each limited partner, provided the present fair
salable value of the assets of such limited partner is probably
sufficient to pay his debts, including such unpaid subscription."
The importance of this section is that a conveyance by an
"insolvent" as here defined is declared fraudulent as to creditors
in section 4, if without fair consideration.' A person cannot give
away his property as against creditors if he is or thereby becomes
"insolvent," regardless of intent.
This section clears up a doubtful point. It is true that under
the Minnesota state insolvency law, "insolvent" means unable to
pay debts as they come due in the ordinary course of business,
and that this is the common-law definition of insolvency for the
purpose of insolvency acts.40 However. "insolvency" is also used
to denote the fact that the value of a person's property is-not
equal to his obligations, 41 and this comparing of assets with debts
3sStone v. Myers. (1864) 9 Minn. 303 (287); Byrnes v. Volz, (1893)
53 Minn. 110, 54 N.W. 942; Dougan v. Dougan, (1903) 90 Minn. 471,
97 N.W. 122; Murphy v. Casey (1922) 151 Minn. 480, 187 N.W. 416.39Daniels v. Palmer, (1886) 35 Minn. 347, 29 N.W. 162; Dunnell's
Digest- sec. 4533.40Glenn. Creditors' Rights and Remedies, sec. 370.41Daniels v. Palmer, (1886) 35 Minn. 347, 29 N.W. 162.
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is a more fundamental test, than whether or not at a particular
moment, a person has the ready money to pay accruing debts.
This comparison of property with obligations is the test of insol-
vency adopted in the Bankruptcy Act,42 and in this Uniform Act.
There are indications that for the purpose of determining
whether a conveyance was fraudulent, the Minnesota court, prior
to the passage of the Uniform Act would have used the same
broad test.42 There are cases holding that if a debtor is em-
barrassed, and cannot readily turn his assets to pay his debts, a
voluntary conveyance is void as to creditors, though the value
of the assets may exceed his debts.4 4 The Uniform Act is more
favorable to the debtor on this point, requiring insolvency to make
the conveyance constructively fraudulent under section 4. How-
ever, the use of the words "present fair salable value" of the
assets in the definition and especially the provisions of section
5 and 6 are to be noted. The fact that the debtor was embarrassed,
although not insolvent, would, of course, be evidence of actual
intent to defraud under section 7 of the act, if he made a gift
of part of his property, not sufficient to render him insolvent.
In determining insolvency "probable liability on his existing
debts as they become absolute and matured" raises some interest-
ing questions of fact. What is the probable liability on contin-
gent, and unliquidated debts? The likelihood of the contingency
happening is an important factor. It would seem that in cases
of serious doubt the debtor should take the risk rather than the
creditor, and should not give away his property, when subject to
contingent liability that is likely to become absolute.
The second part of section 2 prescribes rules for determining
the solvency or insolvency of a partnership, providing that the
surplus assets of the individual partners above their debts, shall
be 'added to the partnership property in making the comparison
with partnershiip debts. This clears up a point on which there is
considerable doubt and an absence of decisions in Minnesota.
"Section 3. Fair Consideration. Fair consideration is given
for property, or obligation,
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a
fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed
or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or
(b) When such property, or obligation, is received in good
faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount
42Sec. 1 a (15).43 Filley v. Register, (1860) 4 Minn. 391 (296).
"
4 Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances 226.
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not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the
property, or obligation obtained."
"Fair consideration": as here defined, is used in sections 4, 5,
6 and 8, to declare certain conveyances fraudulent regardless of
intent if made without "fair consideration." It is to be noted
that there must be a fair equivalent and good faith of-"the grantee.
A conveyance for an inadequate consideration , or -where a gift is
primarily intended, but some incidental consideration is involved,
is constructively fraudulent under the four sections mentioned,
as well as a gift with no consideration. The presence of considera-
tion sufficient for a binding contract is not enough. There must
be "fair consideration" as here defined.4 However, if a purchaser
gives less than a fair consideration in good faith, he is entitled
to hold the property as security for repayment under section 9 (2).
Prior to the passage of the act, the decisions regarded in-
adequate consideration as evidence of a fraudulent intent,48 and
the section may involve some change of the law in treating an
inadequate consideration like no consideration, as regards hinder-
ing and defrauding creditors. Of course, if the debtor sells
his property for an inadequate price, not a fair equivalent, he
has decreased his property which the creditor can reach, and
hindered the collection of the debt. It is chiefly a matter of
extent of the wrong to the creditor, whether the debtor gives
away his property, or gets some inadequate price in return.
In cases where there is no constructive fraud, lack of fair
consideration would, of course, be evidence of actual intent to
defraud under section 7 of the act.
Satisfaction of an antecedent debt is "fair consideration" under
the definition. The rule is thus continued that a preference of
one creditor is not a fraudulent conveyance, 4 and that the remedy
45An example of lack of fair consideration would be where'the
debtor conveys his property to a relative, who in return pays some
debts of the debtor not at all equal to the value of the property, the
motive back of the conveyance being the debtor's desire to provide for
the relative or give the property to him. While the payment of the
debts would be consideration for a binding contract, it would not be
"fair consideration;" and the conveyance would be fraudulent under
section 4, if made by an insolvent.4OCarson v. Hawley, (1901) 82 Minn. 204, 84 N.W. 746; Bond v.'
Stryker, (1898) 73 Minn. 265, 76 N.W. 26. In some instances the court
has treated a conveyance where a fair equivalent in property was not
obtained, the same as a gift, for instance, conveyance on an agreement
to support. Tupper v. Thompson, (1880) 26 Minn. 385, 4 N.W. 621;
McCord v. Knowlton, (1900) 79 Minn. 299, 82 N.W. 589. See Bigelow,
Fraudulent Conveyances 608 et seq.; 27 CJ. 544.47Dunnell's Digest, sec. 3852.
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is under the Bankruptcy Act which provide for the recovery
back of certain preferences. The section requires good faith of
the grantee; but it is hardly to be supposed that it is intended to
change the rule that even though the debtor prefers a friendly
creditor with intent to spite a hostile creditor, and prevetit him
from recovering his debt, as the friendly creditor knows, it is
not a fraudulent conveyance.
The intent of the section is obviously to require the debtor
to use his property either in paying his debts or in securing
property in return which may be available for creditors unless
exempt.4 8 There is no provision that moral obligations, relation-
ship, "meritorious consideration" or executory agreements con-
stitute "fair consideration." There must be actual property. This
raises many interesting questions. How under this section can
there be "fair considerations" to sustain, if made by an insolvent,
or otherwise constructively fraudulent, the following convey-
ances: settlements either before or after marriage, conveyance
on promise to support, conveyance on any moral obligation or
duty, conveyance on agreement to render services in the future,
on agreement to pay money or convey property in the future, or
conveyance on any other executory consideration? Of course,
if the promise to pay money or convey property is subsequently
carried out, "fair consideration" has been received. ' But can
services ever constitute "fair consideration" except as the basis
of an antecedent debt? In construing the words "antecedent
debt," however, it is not unlikely that the court would hold to
the present rule, that a debt outlawed by the Statute of Limita-
tions furnishes consideration.49 While the right to sue is barred
by statute, the outlawed debt still exists as a debt.
This section, while in general stating the former law, appar-
ently makes some changes; and it is to be hoped that the courts in
construing it may bear in mind section 11 of the act, and strive
for uniform interpretation in the different states.
(To be concluded.)
48There is nothing in the section to the effect that a debtor may not
receive property in exchange which is exempt under statute. Jacoby v.
Parkland, etc., Co., (1889) 41 Minn. 227, 43 N.W. 52. But see Kangas
v. Roby, (1920) 264 Fed. 93. 45 A.B.R. 209, and discussion of case in
5 MiNNESOTA LAw REvIEw 383..
4 9Frost v. Steele, (1891) 46 Minn. 1, 48 N.W. 413; 27 CJ. 539.
The broad definition of "debt" in section 1 is to be borne in mind.
It would apparently include an agreement for alimony and settlement
of property rights, such as was sustained in McNally v. Emmetsburg
Nat'l Bank, (Ia. 1922) 192 N.W. 925. In such a case the question is
one of fraudulent intent under section 7 of the act.
